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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I
Committee on Infractions (Infractions Committee)1 hears and resolves
cases involving institutional culpability for major violations of NCAA
rules.2  Its work is among the most important done by any NCAA com-
mittee, cabinet, or council.3  Its decisions have substantial import for
institutions and involved individuals4 alleged to have committed vio-
lations.  Its decisions also have substantial import for other institu-
tions looking to the committee to uphold competitive equity and to
deter cheating and other behaviors injurious to student-athletes and
detrimental both to individual institutional integrity and to the public
perception of varsity athletics as part of the greater university.  The
Infractions Committee is one of the most public “faces” of the NCAA,
with its work regularly tracked and reported by media outlets.  What
it does, and how it does it, has been the subject of numerous law re-
view articles.5  It is a focus of litigation against the NCAA—by media
1. Separate committees handle Division II and Division III infractions cases.  The
composition and processes of those committees are not addressed in this Article.
2. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Operating Bylaws, in 2010–11 NCAA DIVI-
SION I MANUAL, arts. 19.1, 19.1.3 (2010) [hereinafter NCAA Bylaws], available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D111.pdf (art. 19.1 concerns
the Committee on Infractions generally, while art. 19.1.3 addresses the duties of
the committee specifically).  “Major” violations are distinguished in the NCAA
bylaws from “secondary” violations. Id. art. 19.02.2 (Types of Violations).  A sec-
ondary violation is a violation that is “isolated or inadvertent in nature, provides
or is intended to provide only a minimal recruiting, competitive or other advan-
tage and does not include any significant recruiting inducement or extra benefit.”
Id. art. 19.02.2.1 (Violation, Secondary).  Any violation that is not secondary is
“major.” Id. art. 19.02.2.2 (Violation, Major).
3. Because of the importance of its work, the Infractions Committee is one of the few
NCAA committees that reports directly to the NCAA Division I Board of Direc-
tors. Id. art. 21.7.8 (Committees Reporting to Board of Directors).
4. Institutional culpability, of course, results from the misconduct of individuals
who represent an institution.  Those individuals—coaches, other institutional
staff members, student-athletes, and boosters—may be subject to sanctions as
well, but these sanctions are imposed indirectly through penalties imposed on the
institution.
5. See, e.g., Robin J. Green, Does the NCAA Play Fair? A Due Process Analysis of
NCAA Enforcement Regulations, 42 DUKE L.J. 99 (1992); John Kitchin, The
NCAA and Due Process, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71 (1996); Gene A. Marsh, A
Call for Dissent and Further Independence in the NCAA Infractions Process, 26
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 695 (2009); Gene A. Marsh & Marie Robbins, Weigh-
ing the Interests of the Institution, the Membership and Institutional Representa-
tives in an NCAA Investigation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 667 (2003); Michael Rogers &
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outlets seeking its records,6 by coaches and other involved individuals
challenging its decisions,7 and by boosters and others claiming injury
to reputation.8  With such high stakes, it matters a great deal who
serves on the Infractions Committee and how they conduct the com-
mittee’s business.
Since at least the time when Jerry Tarkanian sued the NCAA,9
there have been calls for changes to NCAA enforcement and infrac-
tions processes.10  The particular focus of this Article is the composi-
Rory Ryan, Navigating the Bylaw Maze in NCAA Major-Infractions Cases, 37 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 749 (2007); Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9 (2000); Ronald J. Thompson, Due Process and the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association: Are There Any Constitutional Standards?,
41 UCLA L. REV. 1651 (1994).
6. See Paul Flemming, Appeals Court Rules NCAA Must Release Florida State Doc-
uments, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Florida), Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.usatoday.
com/sports/college/2009-10-01-ncaa-florida-state_N.htm; Todd Jones & Jill
Riepenhoff, Hiding Information; NCAA Has Ways to Dodge Scrutiny; Privacy
Law, Secure Web Site Used to Skirt Public-Records Laws, COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Ohio), June 22, 2009, http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/
2009/06/22/NCAA_FERPA.ART_ART_06-22-09_A1_55E8IP4.html.
7. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); Bassett v. NCAA, 428 F. Supp. 2d 675
(E.D. Ky. 2006); Cohane v. Greiner, No. 04-CV-943S, 2006 WL 625842 (W.D.N.Y.
Mar. 10, 2006); Cottrell v. NCAA, 975 So. 2d 306 (Ala. 2007); Neuheisel v. Univ.
of Washington, No. 03-2-34268-8SEA, 2004 WL 5216751 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec.
10, 2004).
8. Keller v. NCAA, No. CV-2004-28 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 2007).
9. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179.  Tarkanian was the head men’s basketball coach at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV). Id. at 180.  He was suspended by
UNLV after findings by the Infractions Committee that he had committed NCAA
violations. Id. at 180–81.  He sued the NCAA, claiming a failure of due process in
the infractions hearing. Id. at 181.
10. Subsequent to Tarkanian, the NCAA appointed a special committee to review
and make recommendations regarding the enforcement and infractions
processes. SPECIAL COMM. TO REVIEW THE NCAA ENFORCEMENT & INFRACTIONS
PROCESS, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASS’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE NCAA ENFORCEMENT AND INFRACTIONS
PROCESS (1991) [hereinafter LEE REPORT] (on file with the authors).  The commit-
tee was chaired by Rex Lee, a former United States Solicitor General, and in-
cluded as members Warren Burger, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States; Benjamin Civiletti, a former United States Attorney General;
a former state supreme court judge; a former federal circuit court judge; former
federal district court judges; university administrators; athletics administrators;
and faculty athletics representatives. Id.  The special committee made numerous
recommendations, id. at 3–8, all but a few of which were incorporated into en-
forcement and infractions processes.  One recommendation not adopted was to
have a special hearing officer independent of NCAA institutions act as fact finder
in assessing violations in infractions cases not resolved by summary disposition.
Id. at 5–6.  For more discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 58 and 59.
More recently, the NCAA hired a special consultant, James Duff, to review
enforcement and infractions processes and make recommendations for changes.
Duff submitted his report in 2006. See JAMES DUFF, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: RE-
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tion of the Infractions Committee and its consensus decision-making
process.  We conclude that the current committee structure and
processes effectively serve the purposes and interests of NCAA mem-
ber institutions and are better suited to meet all of the roles and re-
sponsibilities of the Infractions Committee than any proposed model
we have seen.
The authors of this Article both recently completed nine years of
service on the Infractions Committee.  One (Potuto) chaired the In-
fractions Committee and also served on an NCAA Special Internal Re-
view Committee that worked with a consultant whose charge was to
evaluate and make recommendations regarding the enforcement and
infractions processes.11  The other (Parkinson) was the Infractions
Committee’s first coordinator of appeals and also chaired a subcom-
mittee whose recommendations regarding committee penalties were
presented to the NCAA Division I Board of Directors.
II. COMPOSITION OF THE INFRACTIONS COMMITTEE
A. Role of Infractions Committee and NCAA Structure
To be effective, the Infractions Committee must command the con-
fidence of member institutions, their staffs and constituencies, as well
as NCAA staff.  While the committee must work with sensitivity to-
ward and in cooperation with a member institution appearing before
it, its work ultimately must be independent of the institution and its
conference and also independent of NCAA senior administration,
NCAA enforcement staff, and other NCAA committees and the staffs
assigned to them.12  Moreover, the Infractions Committee must con-
duct its business without bias and uninfluenced by criticism from me-
dia reports and otherwise.
Fundamentally, the job of the Infractions Committee is to exercise
reasoned and informed judgment in hearing and deciding cases and in
imposing penalties.  Critical components of such reasoned and in-
formed judgment are that the Infractions Committee adheres to its
role within NCAA processes as adjudicative, not legislative; that it de-
cides cases and imposes penalties as prescribed by NCAA bylaws that
govern its operations; that its members know, understand, and appro-
priately apply bylaws that set forth substantive standards governing
conduct; that its decisions are based exclusively on the record before
PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NCAA SPECIAL INTERNAL REVIEW COMMIT-
TEE (2006) (on file with the authors).  Several of Duff’s recommendations were
incorporated into the NCAA Bylaws in January 2008.
11. DUFF, supra note 10, at 1.  The special consultant, James Duff, currently is Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
12. For further discussion of the committee’s independence, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 52–85.
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it; that it acts with neither favoritism toward nor animus against par-
ticular institutions or individuals; and that it assesses violations and
penalties with an understanding of how they influence the world of
intercollegiate athletics, competitive equity among institutions, and
rules compliance.
Through adoption of bylaws, NCAA member institutions set the
boundaries and rules by which the Infractions Committee operates,
define what constitutes violations, dictate the type and scope of penal-
ties to be imposed, articulate the processes by which members are ap-
pointed to the Infractions Committee, and establish the criteria for
membership on it.  As with any legislative authority, member institu-
tions may change the infractions process prospectively by amending or
repealing current bylaws or adding new ones.  What they cannot do is
intervene to influence the outcome of any particular infractions case.
The prime ways in which member institutions assess the work of the
Infractions Committee are by review of its published reports,13 by the
caliber of its individual members, and by how suited the Infractions
Committee is, taken as a whole, to perform the work assigned to it.
B. Membership Requirements
Membership requirements are both formal—described in the black
letter of NCAA bylaws—and informal.  Formal requirements may be
stated quickly.  There are ten members of the Infractions Commit-
tee.14  Of these, eight members hear and decide cases (the hearing
committee) and two members are appointed specifically as coordina-
tors of appeals15 to represent the Infractions Committee in proceed-
ings before the Infractions Appeals Committee.16  At least seven
committee members “shall be at present or previously on the staff of
an active member institution or member conference” of the NCAA.17
These seven members may not all be from the same NCAA subdivision
of Division I.18  At least two committee members, but no more than
three, must be “public” members.19  Public members not only are un-
13. This aspect of the Infractions Committee’s work is beyond the scope of this
Article.
14. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art. 19.1.1 (Composition of Committee).
15. Id.  The coordinators of appeals attend infractions hearings but are not active
participants in either hearings or committee deliberations. Id. art. 19.1.1.4.
16. Id. art. 19.1.1.4 (Duties of the Coordinators of Appeals).
17. Id. art. 19.1.1 (Composition of Committee).
18. Id.  Division I institutions are divided into three parts.  The Division I Football
Bowl Subdivision (FBS) fields football teams that compete in post-season bowl
games.  The Division I Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) fields football
teams that compete in an NCAA football championship.  The third subdivision
does not offer football as a varsity sport.  In practice, the subdivision restriction
means that there must be at least one member of the hearing committee from the
FCS or from a Division I institution that does not compete in football.
19. Id.  One of the public members may serve as a coordinator of appeals. Id.
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associated with a member university or athletics conference, but they
also may neither represent coaches or athletes nor be affiliated with a
professional or similar sports organization.20  At least two positions on
the committee must be held by men, and at least two must be held by
women.21  Finally, members of the Infractions Committee are term-
limited out after serving three three-year terms, either on the hearing
committee or as a coordinator of appeals.22
In addition to these formal membership requirements, the Infrac-
tions Committee operates pursuant to informal requirements that are
critical to the functioning and public perception of the committee.
These requirements cover two bases.  One set of requirements focuses
on the experience, background, stature, and work habits of each indi-
vidual member of the Infractions Committee.  The other set of require-
ments focuses on the Infractions Committee in its entirety to assure a
balance of perspectives and a range of relevant experiences.
1. Individual Member Qualifications
Clearly, members of the Infractions Committee must know and un-
derstand NCAA bylaws and processes.23  They also must understand
the role of the Infractions Committee as delineated in those bylaws
and adhere to that prescribed role.  But service on the Infractions
Committee demands far more.
a. Time Demands
Infractions Committee service entails considerably more time than
any other NCAA service.  Annually there are six hearing weekends,
typically with two cases heard during each weekend.  Getting “up to
snuff” on all the materials in the record likely entails at least twenty
hours of preparation time.  When a case involves a large number of
violations, and especially when a coach or other involved individual is
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. art. 19.1.1.3 (Term of Office).  Following a three-year hiatus, a hearing com-
mittee member who is term-limited out after nine years of service may return to
the committee to serve as a coordinator of appeals. Id.  For further discussion of
committee term limits, see infra text accompanying notes 46–51.
23. This is not meant to imply that each new appointee to the committee must have
such knowledge and experience prior to committee service.  Public members do
not have deep experience in the collegiate athletics world, and that is a good
thing—members without such experience often bring healthy perspectives and
insights as “outsiders” that otherwise would be lost. See, e.g., Marsh, supra note
5, at 705.  Nonetheless, there must be limits on the number of members who come
to the committee in need of “on-the-job training,” and it is imperative that those
needing “on-the-job training” have both the ability and the diligence to develop,
rather rapidly, a thorough understanding of applicable NCAA bylaws and
processes.
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at risk of findings of commission of violations, preparation time easily
may exceed forty hours.24  Each case also entails additional time asso-
ciated with post-hearing deliberations and the production of an infrac-
tions report.  Production of the report also is time-intensive.25
In addition to cases adjudicated by hearing, the Infractions Com-
mittee resolves cases by summary disposition,26 hears appeals from
secondary case dispositions,27 and reviews annual reports regarding
compliance with penalties by institutions on probation.28  The chair,
and on occasion the hearing committee, also resolves procedural and
other issues that may arise prior to a hearing.  Finally, there are mat-
ters that arise independent of individual hearings that require the In-
fractions Committee’s time and attention, including, for example,
recommendation of bylaw changes and oversight of the schedule and
processing of cases by the NCAA enforcement staff.
24. The record before the Infractions Committee contains the NCAA enforcement
staff’s allegations, with a description of how the violations were committed and
inclusion of the information on which the staff relied in bringing each allegation.
It also includes an institutional response, including supportive documentation.
Often the response requires several large binders.  When a coach or other in-
volved individual is at risk of findings of commission of violations, there also will
be a response from that individual, including supporting documentation.
25. Each case is assigned to a hearing committee member who is responsible for
drafting an infractions report with the assistance of the director or assistant di-
rector of the Infractions Committee.  The draft report may go through several
revisions before the committee member believes it is ready for review by the full
committee.  There is at least one conference call during which the full committee
conducts a line-by-line analysis of the draft.  Once a report is approved by the full
committee, it is published.
26. See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art. 32.7.  Summary disposition occurs, without
a hearing, when the institution, the NCAA enforcement staff, or both conduct a
thorough investigation of possible violations and both sides stipulate to proposed
findings of violations and penalties. Id. arts. 32.7.1.1 (Thorough Investigation),
32.7.1.2 (Written Report), 32.7.1.3 (Proposed Penalties).  The proposal is re-
viewed by the Infractions Committee, which may accept the findings and penal-
ties as proposed or reject them and set the case for a full hearing. Id. arts.
32.7.1.4 (Committee on Infractions Review), 32.7.1.4.1 (Approval of Findings and
Penalties), 32.7.1.4.2 (Findings Not Approved), 32.7.1.4.3 (Penalties Not Ap-
proved).  The Infractions Committee also may review an institutional appeal
from the refusal of the enforcement staff to resolve a case through the summary
disposition process. Id. art. 32.10 (Appeal Procedure).
27. See id. arts. 19.6.1 (Appeal of Secondary Violations), 32.4.4 (Appeal of Secondary
Cases).  Cases involving only secondary violations are resolved by the NCAA’s
Vice President for Enforcement Services. Id. art. 19.5.1 (Penalties for Secondary
Violations).  Certain of these secondary violations require approval of the chair or
another member of the Infractions Committee designated by the chair. Id.  Not
all violations are clearly major or secondary.  Those on the cusp require commit-
tee approval to be treated as secondary violations.  Another category of secondary
violations involves penalties such as fines. Id.  Articles 19.6.1 and 32.4.4 of the
NCAA Bylaws give institutions the right to appeal actions taken in these latter
secondary cases to the full Infractions Committee. Id. arts. 19.6.1, 32.4.4.
28. See id. art. 19.5.2.4 (describing probationary periods and conditions of probation).
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With all these responsibilities falling on the Infractions Commit-
tee, it is critical that each member of the committee can devote the
necessary time to the task.  Because all committee members are un-
paid volunteers, generally with full-time, high-level positions back on
campus, in a conference office, or in a law firm or judge’s chambers,29
this is a tall order.  It is not surprising, then, that most committee
member resignations prior to completion of a full term (or the comple-
tion of three full terms) come from members who cannot devote the
necessary time and attention to the Infractions Committee’s work.
b. End-Line Professional Responsibility
In addition to devoting the time required to manage such a heavy
workload, Infractions Committee members must have the judgment
that comes with experience and the gravitas and stature that comes
with end-line professional responsibility and achievement.  The com-
mittee is entrusted by NCAA member institutions to deal with sensi-
tive and important subject matters; to treat in complete confidence
private information regarding institutions, their staffs, and student-
athletes; to pay heed to the demands of competitive equity; to impose
penalties that underscore and encourage rules-compliant behavior;
and to be and be perceived to be fair to institutions and involved indi-
viduals who appear before it.  The Infractions Committee expects the
presence at every infractions hearing of the president or chancellor of
the university, its athletics director, its faculty athletics representa-
tive,30 and the head coach of any sport subject to penalties.  Usually
present are a university’s general counsel and outside counsel.  When
a coach or other individual is at risk for findings of involvement in
major infractions, that individual is almost always represented by
counsel.  For the smooth functioning of hearings, Infractions Commit-
tee members must match these hearing participants in professional
accomplishment.  The public perception of decisions of the Infractions
29. Occasionally a committee member is not engaged in full-time employment away
from committee work, but that is certainly the exception rather than the rule.
30. Each NCAA member institution must have a faculty athletics representative
(FAR). NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art. 6.1.3 (Faculty Athletics Representative).
The FAR is typically a full professor with tenure but also may be a senior campus
administrator outside of athletics with faculty rank.  At most institutions the uni-
versity president or chancellor appoints the FAR, often with the advice and con-
sent of the Faculty Senate. Id. art. 4.02.2 (Definitions: Faculty Athletics
Representative).  FARs represent their respective institutions and faculties in
NCAA and conference governance. Id. Each FAR also has campus duties as as-
signed by the president or chancellor. FACULTY ATHLETICS REPRESENTATIVES
ASS’N, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, FACULTY ATHLETICS REPRESENTATIVE
HANDBOOK (2010), available at www.farawebsite.org/files/FARAHandbook.htm.
Most typically, FARs have campus oversight or direct responsibility for NCAA
rules compliance, academic standards related to student-athlete performance,
athletics academic integrity, and student-athlete well-being.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-3DR\NEB301.txt unknown Seq: 9 23-MAR-11 12:19
2011] IF IT AIN’T BROKE, DON’T FIX IT 445
Committee is bolstered by the caliber and background of committee
members.  The professional credentials of committee members also
are a component of the NCAA defense to lawsuits challenging commit-
tee decisions.  Finally, to attract public members of the caliber and
backgrounds needed, institutional members must match their
credentials.
Typically members of the Infractions Committee have been excep-
tionally prominent in their fields.31  It is imperative that members
continue to have the type of substantial supervisory and decision-
making experience and superior analytical skills associated with full
professors with tenure, athletics directors, conference commissioners,
and general counsel of universities.32
2. The Infractions Committee in Its Entirety
Each individual Infractions Committee member brings a bundle of
experiences and strengths.  No one member embodies all the charac-
teristics needed in the full committee.  Appointment of individual
members, therefore, must be effected with recognition of the needs of
the full committee.  To be able effectively to perform its responsibili-
ties, the Infractions Committee, through the totality of the exper-
iences and backgrounds of individual members, must have (1)
athletics experience, (2) a faculty presence, (3) legal knowledge and
skills, and (4) a predominant campus presence.  Other characteristics
are less prominent, but nonetheless important.
Ideally, the hearing committee would have two public members,
five members from the campuses, and a conference commissioner.  At
least two members would be full professors with tenure who are FARs
or former FARs, and at least two members would be senior athletics
administrators with broad-based, end-line experience and responsibil-
ities.  Finally, at least six, and certainly no fewer than four, members
of the hearing committee would be lawyers.
31. Among those who served were Charles Alan Wright and Frank Remington.
Wright was co-author of a multi-volume treatise on federal practice and proce-
dure, CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (4th ed.
2008), and president of the American Law Institute.  Remington was a chief ar-
chitect of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, MODEL PENAL CODE
(1962), and a director of the American Bar Foundation.  More recently, Jack
Friedenthal both served on and chaired the Infractions Committee.  Friedenthal
was faculty athletics representative for Stanford University when he was on the
law faculty there.  He has served as dean of the George Washington University
Law School and is co-author of the most widely used civil procedure text, JACK
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE (10th ed. 2009).
32. It may be advisable to amend article 19.1.1 of the NCAA Bylaws, which addresses
the composition of the Infractions Committee, to state explicitly that committee
members should have this experience. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art. 19.1.1.
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a. Athletics Experience
The Infractions Committee as a whole must have substantial expe-
rience with and understanding of the collegiate athletics enterprise as
experienced on the campuses.  That understanding must include the
nature of the relationship between coach and student-athlete—what
is common practice, what is appropriate or necessary, and what
crosses the line.  From the perspective of the institution or individuals
appearing before the Infractions Committee, campus athletics experi-
ence of committee members assures a sensitive appreciation of the
athletics enterprise and the particular pressures generated by college
athletics.  From the perspective of the NCAA membership as a whole,
this athletics experience assures that the Infractions Committee will
be able properly to evaluate claims that might seem persuasive or
compelling to one with little or no knowledge of the athletics world,
but which may be entirely unpersuasive to one with such knowledge.
The athletics experience needed most typically will come from an
athletics director.33  Athletics directors are part of campus life.  They
bring critical on-the-ground experience, with day-to-day supervision
and oversight responsibilities in their athletics programs.  Athletics
experience in compliance and eligibility matters can come from
FARs34 and, to a lesser extent, from university general counsel who
have dealt with athletics issues on campus, faculty members who have
served on athletics planning or oversight committees, and even public
members who have had substantial athletics experience.35
Since the restructuring after Tarkanian, at least one member of
the Infractions Committee has been a conference commissioner.  Con-
ference commissioners offer a unique and valuable perspective.  They
bring insight regarding how conferences track and administer campus
compliance activities as well as coach behavior.  They understand dis-
tribution formulas and how penalties may impact conference teams
and institutions not before the Infractions Committee.
33. Athletics directors (and, on occasion, conference commissioners) often also are
former student-athletes or coaches, and, as such, bring added dimension to their
consideration of infractions matters.  An argument could be made that represen-
tation on the Infractions Committee by a currently active coach would infuse the
committee with particularly valuable insight, but the coach’s practice and compe-
tition schedules almost inevitably would conflict with committee responsibilities,
particularly the ability to attend all hearings.  It also is likely that a coach’s ac-
tive status would generate a concern regarding her ability to distance herself
from parochial interests in reviewing infractions matters.
34. FARs bring an understanding of NCAA rules and rules compliance deriving from
their campus oversight responsibilities.  On occasion, athletics directors and con-
ference commissioners also have such experience.
35. One former public member, for example, had represented an institution in a prior
infractions case.  A current public member is general counsel for the National
Federation of State High School Associations, which deals regularly with issues
analogous to those confronted in intercollegiate athletics.
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b. Faculty Presence
In the pre-Tarkanian days, nearly all members of the Infractions
Committee were members of the tenured faculty at member institu-
tions.  As recently as when the authors of this Article joined the In-
fractions Committee, four of the eight members of the hearing
committee were members of the faculty.36  Faculty status brings a fo-
cused appreciation of the academic mission and speaks to the percep-
tion on campus and in the public regarding the extent to which college
athletics are part of that mission.  Although there is no question that
the Infractions Committee acts independently of NCAA, conference, or
institutional influence in deciding cases, faculty members—at least in
public perception—bring an extra dose of independence to the task.
Faculty members may evaluate the gravity of violations according
to a different calculus than that employed by athletics administrators
or others who are embedded in the athletics enterprise.  They also
may have a different perspective on circumstances argued to mitigate
institutional responsibility.  Without faculty members on the Infrac-
tions Committee, there is risk that obvious soft spots in an enforce-
ment staff, institution, or coach argument will be overlooked or
missed.  These may be complex or hidden, but they also may be simple
and straightforward.  For example, designation of the wrong campus
building or administrator with regard to a particular issue, if noted,
may lead to holes in an explanation or the context of a violation.
Knowing how exams are administered, graded, and recorded, and
campus and professional organization requirements for retaining ex-
ams and other graded papers, may expose a deficiency in protocol
needing explanation.
FARs bring an added dimension.  They not only have faculty status
and perspective, but they also have a close understanding of campus
athletics.  They generally have oversight responsibilities in rules com-
pliance as well as academic standards and integrity.  They frequently
write waiver requests and report violations and are involved in cam-
pus investigations of potential violations.  They also are active in ath-
letics conference governance and have experience with a host of NCAA
committees, often committees whose members do not include athletics
administrators with broad-based supervisory experience.37
36. At the time the authors served on the committee, it had three faculty members on
the eight-member hearing committee, including two who served as faculty athlet-
ics representatives and a third who served as an athletics director.  In addition, a
faculty member served as one of the committee’s two coordinators of appeals.
37. These committees include the initial eligibility and progress-toward-degree
waiver committees. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, arts. 21.7.5.1.3.1, 21.7.5.1.3.2.
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c. Legal Knowledge and Skills
Legal knowledge and skills are critical attributes of the Infractions
Committee as a whole.  Presentations of cases by institutions and
coaches generally are handled by lawyers.  Procedural issues routinely
arise at hearings.  Frequently allusions are made to legal processes
outside NCAA infractions, most often to the criminal justice system.
Lawyers are needed both to respond to these claims and, perhaps
more importantly, to understand that the legal context of infractions
hearings is different in kind from criminal and even civil trials.38
Lawyers also are needed to protect the hearing record, particularly as
infractions cases increasingly trigger litigation against the NCAA.
The Infractions Committee has had outstanding non-lawyer mem-
bers, and their contributions are critical as well.  It is important that
infractions processes and hearings do not become so legalistic that
they are inaccessible to laypersons.  Often the non-lawyer members of
the Infractions Committee play a vital role in ensuring a proper bal-
ance between legalese and “straight talk,” particularly as they bring
other needed expertise to the table.39
Over the years, the Infractions Committee has averaged six law-
yers among the eight members of the hearing committee.  We believe
it is important that this ratio continue and imperative that at least
half of the hearing committee members are lawyers.  In addition, both
coordinators of appeals must be lawyers as it is critical in this position
to be able thoroughly to understand an appellate record and to re-
spond effectively to institutions and involved individuals in their ap-
peals.  Most of the members of the Infractions Appeals Committee are
lawyers, and legal issues arise frequently during appellate hearings.
Finally, we believe that the public members of the Infractions
Committee must be judges or lawyers who have attained prominence
in their fields.  Judges or former judges offer a uniquely helpful per-
spective.  They bring not only gravitas but also the experience of man-
aging dockets and lawyers appearing before them.  They also bring
automatic status to the Infractions Committee that is helpful in hear-
ings and in litigation against the committee.40
38. A description of the conduct of infractions hearings is beyond the scope of this
Article.  For a general description of infractions processes, as well as student-
athlete reinstatement, see Josephine R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules Adoption, Inter-
pretation, Enforcement, and Infractions Processes: The Laws That Regulate Them
and the Nature of Court Review, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 257 (2010).
39. In recent years, for example, non-lawyer members often are athletics directors or
conference commissioners.
40. From 1993, when public members first were made part of the Infractions Com-
mittee, and until recently, all have been former state or federal judges or justices.
Prior judicial experience clearly has been a savory ingredient in the mix of hear-
ing committee backgrounds and experiences, but it is not essential.  Currently
three public members sit on the ten-member full committee; none are former
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d. Campus Presence
Campus life, both academic and athletic, is in fundamental ways a
world unto itself.  A campus presence brings regular interactions with
students, an important component of committee expertise.  Varsity
athletics competition produces many benefits, but it also compresses
and strains academic goals.  Obvious stresses result from student-ath-
lete class absences caused by competition on the road, the effect on the
classroom environment produced by academically at-risk student-ath-
letes, and class enrollment oddities produced by student-athletes
whose practice and training schedules likely dictate avoidance of mid-
and especially late afternoon classes.  There is also the perception held
by some faculty that significant numbers of student-athletes are not
serious students and the impact these perceptions have on campus
governance and the psyches of student-athletes.  Campus academic
protocols and requirements may be byzantine and certainly appear to
be so to those who are not active participants.  The Infractions Com-
mittee must understand campus life—academic, athletic, and all as-
pects of student life and campus governance—to place in context the
circumstances involved in an infractions case.
e. Additional Factors
Conference Affiliation.  Information related to particular cases or
issues is confidential within the Infractions Committee.  However,
there are other matters—for example, areas in which violations recur
or areas of particular sensitivity about which institutions should be on
the alert—that may and should be shared.  Although Infractions Com-
mittee reports discuss these matters, it is helpful to have someone
who interacts regularly with conference governance groups.  For these
same reasons, athletics conferences have an interest in someone serv-
ing on the Infractions Committee who comes from an institution in
their conference.
There should not be more than one nonpublic member of the In-
fractions Committee from the same athletics conference.  This require-
ment redounds in matters of perception.  More fundamentally,
however, it responds to efficiency and experience concerns.  Athletics
conferences sit in different areas of the country.  They have different
rules of operation and conference governance structures, including dif-
ferent processes to effect rules-compliance oversight of their member
universities.  Some have more lucrative media contracts than others.
In some conferences member institutions have substantially larger
judges, but all are lawyers who have had distinguished careers and who bring
special expertise to the committee.  Of the ten members of the current committee,
nine are lawyers, including seven of the eight members of the hearing committee
and both coordinators of appeals.
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athletics budgets as compared to institutions in other conferences.  All
of these differences argue for broadening experience by having mem-
bers from different conferences (or from institutions that are indepen-
dent from any athletics conference).
Practical considerations also are at least equally important.  As
with members of all other NCAA committees, Infractions Committee
members do not participate in matters related to an institution in the
athletics conference of which their institution is a member.41  Mem-
bers of the committee act independently of their institutions and con-
ferences; nonetheless, recusal avoids any perception that a committee
member may favor or disfavor certain institutions or conferences.
Were there to be more than one member from a conference on the com-
mittee, then there would be more than one necessary recusal any time
an institution from that conference appeared before the committee.
Gender and Racial Diversity.  As noted earlier, at least two posi-
tions on the Infractions Committee must be held by men, and at least
two must be held by women.42  In addition to this formal membership
requirement, the committee for many years has sought out persons of
color to serve.  At present, there are two such persons on the Infrac-
tions Committee.  These membership criteria reflect a longstanding
NCAA commitment to diversity and inclusion.43
Geographical Diversity.  The final informal requirement for the In-
fractions Committee, that there be geographical diversity reflected in
the home bases of members, is desirable, but by no means as impor-
tant as any of the other requirements.44  Some violations are more
likely to happen in certain geographical areas.  For example, prospec-
tive student-athletes are much more likely to take an unofficial cam-
41. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art. 32.1.3 (stating that a member of the Infractions
Committee “shall neither appear at the hearing nor participate on the committee
when the member is directly connected with an institution under investigation or
has a personal, professional or institutional affiliation that reasonably would re-
sult in the appearance of prejudice”).  While that standard does not explicitly ad-
dress conference affiliation, it is standard practice for committee members to
recuse themselves any time a case involves an institution within their conference.
42. Id. art. 19.1.1 (Composition of Committee).
43. A Minority Opportunities and Interests Committee, whose duties are to “review
issues related to the interests of ethnic minority student-athletes, NCAA minor-
ity programs and NCAA policies that affect ethnic minorities,” was established in
1991. Id. art. 21.2.4.2 (Duties).  Article 2.2.2, addressing the responsibility of
each member institution “to establish and maintain an environment that values
cultural diversity and gender equity,” was added to the NCAA Constitution in
1995.  The NCAA’s commitment became even more pronounced in 2005 when
President Myles Brand created a new Office of Diversity and Inclusion at NCAA
headquarters in Indianapolis.  An overview of that office’s “core values” and ini-
tiatives can be found at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/
Issues/Diversity+and+Inclusion/.
44. Some geographical diversity, of course, is attained naturally from the committee
members’ conference diversity.
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pus visit45 to institutions proximately located to their homes.  The
result is that more unofficial visits are taken to institutions located in
heavily populated geographical areas.  The experiences and expertise
of members from such an area may offer targeted insight in particular
major infractions cases.  In addition, geographical diversity, like con-
ference diversity, facilitates wide dissemination of information con-
cerning committee decisions.
C. Term Limits
Infractions Committee members may serve a maximum of three
three-year terms, either on the hearing committee or as a coordinator
of appeals.46  “Fresh blood” generally is good for any organization, and
the Infractions Committee is no exception.  Term limits provide an
ongoing opportunity to revitalize the committee by appointing new
members with different perspectives and attitudes who are unbur-
dened by socialization into doing things the way they have been done
in the past.
Term limits also provide a definite end-date so that members may
make a full commitment to the Infractions Committee’s work with the
knowledge that they ultimately can return to a more balanced work
life.  As noted earlier, the work of the Infractions Committee is ex-
tremely time-consuming, and it can be difficult to find members who
have both the required gravitas and the willingness to devote the time
necessary for the task.  Difficulties are compounded by formal and in-
formal membership requirements related to gender, race, geography,
and conference affiliation.  Difficulties are compounded again by a
need to have a committee that in its entirety has the requisite back-
grounds and experiences—athletic, academic, campus, and legal—to
understand the dynamics and parameters of information in an infrac-
tions case.  With all of these challenges, it is critical to recruit mem-
bers with “the right stuff,”47 and a fixed term may encourage more
individuals to consider service on the committee, despite the burdens.
On the other hand, term limits can have unintended conse-
quences.48  Departures from the Infractions Committee do not always
45. See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art. 13.02.15.2 (Unofficial Visit).  An unofficial
visit is one financed by a prospective student-athlete and not by the institution.
Id.
46. Id. art. 19.1.1.3 (Term of Office).  A hearing committee member who is term-lim-
ited out after nine years of service may return to the committee, following a
three-year hiatus, to serve as a coordinator of appeals. Id.
47. See TOM WOLFE, THE RIGHT STUFF (1979) (recounting the qualifications of the
individuals recruited to become the nation’s first astronauts).
48. As has been pointed out by commentators, term limits enhance the range of re-
sponsibility and authority of staff and bureaucracy, depriving bodies of exper-
ienced members regardless of competence and contribution. See Linda Cohen &
Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 477, 482–83 (1992); Morris Fiorina,
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occur at regular, anticipated intervals, and term limits can result in
an experience void on the committee.  For example, in a nine-year pe-
riod spanning the time that the authors served on the Infractions
Committee, six members resigned prior to completion of a full nine-
year period of service, in large part because of workload.  An addi-
tional two members left the committee because a change in profes-
sional status rendered them ineligible to continue serving.  These
changes were not evenly distributed over the nine years, but came in
clusters.  The current term limit prevented a reinsertion of experience
into the Infractions Committee through reappointment of a former
member.49  Cluster departures, moreover, create an experience issue
going forward because they continue to skew the organized rotation
that occurs when members complete their terms and new members
are appointed.
One option to address the experience void caused by cluster depar-
tures would be to permit reappointment for a fourth or even additional
terms and leave it to the sound discretion of the nominating body (i.e.,
athletics conferences) and appointing body (i.e., the Division I Board
of Directors) whether to reappoint.  This option, however, may open
the door to reappointment of a current member interested in reap-
pointment, even when there is a perceived need for “fresh blood” or a
perception that the committee member seeking reappointment is no
longer devoting the requisite time and attention to the work.50  Per-
haps a better option to address the experience issue would be to per-
mit a committee member who has served a full nine years to be
reappointed to the committee after a three-year hiatus.  Such a mech-
anism already exists in a limited fashion—a hearing committee mem-
ber who is term-limited out after nine years of service may return to
the committee, after a three-year hiatus, to serve as a coordinator of
appeals.51  That provision could be modified to allow reappointment to
the hearing committee as well (or to allow a coordinator of appeals to
return as a hearing committee member).  Permitting reappointment
after a three-year hiatus would avoid permanent disqualification, per-
Term Limits: Wrong Diagnosis, Wrong Treatment, ALLEGHENY, Winter 1992, at
23–25; Nelson W. Polsby, Some Arguments Against Congressional Term Limits,
16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 104–05 (1993); Julia C. Wommack, Comment,
Congressional Reform: Can Term Limits Close the Door on Political Careerism?,
24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1361, 1407–08 (1993).
49. Former committee members may be brought back as temporary substitutes when
current members are unable to sit for a particular hearing because of schedule
difficulties or recusal due to conflict. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art. 19.1.1.2
(Temporary Substitutes).  This option helps in isolated cases, but it does not re-
spond to a continuing void of experience on the Infractions Committee brought on
by cluster departures.
50. This impact may be ameliorated, however, by authorizing fourth-term reappoint-
ment only when cluster departure creates an experience void.
51. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art. 19.1.1.3 (Term of Office).
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mit reappointment of a member with exemplary prior service, avoid
situations in which the committee lacks needed experience, and yet
relieve any pressure to reappoint a sitting member who seeks to con-
tinue to serve.  It would leave to the sound discretion of the NCAA
Board of Directors how the Infractions Committee is best configured.
At the very least, a system should be implemented to ameliorate clus-
ter departures.
D. Independence, Neutrality, and Infractions Committee
Composition
There can be no disagreement that independence and neutrality
are critical to effective functioning of any adjudicative body.  In the
context of Infractions Committee hearings, the committee must be in-
dependent from the NCAA enforcement staff, which investigates alle-
gations of NCAA violations and presents evidence of violations to the
committee, and neutral toward specific schools and individuals who
appear before it.  The composition of the Infractions Committee can
contribute to perceptions of independence and neutrality or the lack
thereof.  For example, if several members of the Infractions Commit-
tee were from institutions within one particular conference, there pre-
dictably could be a perception that the committee would favor that
conference, even though members recuse themselves from cases in-
volving institutions within their conference.
Over the years, calls have been made for a reconfiguration of the
Infractions Committee, or even abandonment of the committee en-
tirely, to address issues of independence and neutrality.  In 1991, for
example, the Lee Report recommended that the Infractions Committee
relinquish its role as fact finder and serve instead to review disposi-
tions recommended by an independent hearing officer or agreed to by
institution and enforcement staff.52  A more recent, and more modest,
recommendation has been to increase the number of public members
on the Infractions Committee.53  Either proposal, in our view, is a
mistake.
What must be remembered is that the NCAA is a multi-party,
multi-subject association in which member institutions control its
scope, contours, and administration.  They determine the obligations
of membership and what constitutes transgressions—in other words,
NCAA violations.  They also determine how and by whom infractions
cases are to be resolved.
As delineated in NCAA bylaws, the NCAA membership has a con-
crete and particular conception of the infractions process and the role
to be played by the Infractions Committee.  The Infractions Commit-
52. LEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3–8.
53. Marsh, supra note 5, at 702–10.
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tee created under the bylaws (1) is independent of the NCAA enforce-
ment staff, (2) understands and appreciates the various aspects of
administering an intercollegiate athletics program, (3) understands
the various facets of campus life and upholds the primacy of academic
standards and integrity in varsity athletics, (4) provides a full and fair
opportunity to be heard by member institutions and staff members
alleged to have committed major violations, (5) provides an appeal op-
portunity for those found to have committed violations, (6) provides
equal treatment between and among member institutions and their
staffs, (7) is committed to the proper application of the rules and by-
laws adopted by the membership to govern intercollegiate athletics
and the conduct and behaviors of institutions and their staffs, and (8)
is mindful of the interests of the membership as a whole in competi-
tive equity and in rules-compliant behaviors when assessing the grav-
ity of violations and imposing penalties.
The independence of the Infractions Committee within NCAA gov-
ernance is assured structurally through formal lines of demarcation
that make its work separate and distinct from the work of other
NCAA committees or staffs.  Most important is the fact that the com-
position and role of the Infractions Committee are separate and dis-
tinct from the NCAA enforcement staff.54  The failure to understand
this distinction more often than not underlies misperceptions about
Infractions Committee independence.55  If there is any point that
bears repeating, it is this: NCAA enforcement staff members are sala-
ried employees of the NCAA whose job it is to investigate allegations
of NCAA violations and present evidence of major violations to the
infractions committee, typically at an infractions hearing.56  Infrac-
tions Committee members, on the other hand, are unpaid volunteers
whose job is to hear and evaluate evidence presented by all parties in
an infractions hearing.  The enforcement staff bears the burden at
every hearing of proving that violations occurred, and their presenta-
tions are subject to critical examination by an Infractions Committee
that is an “equal opportunity” hearing body in its pointed examination
of presentations by all parties.
After Tarkanian, NCAA member institutions made substantial
changes to the processes governing enforcement staff investigations
54. The Infractions Committee also operates separately and distinctly from the
NCAA’s student-athlete reinstatement committee and its staff and from the In-
fractions Appeals Committee and its staff.
55. See Marsh & Robbins, supra note 5, at 677 (“Simply put, people usually do not
understand that the NCAA enforcement staff is an entirely separate enterprise
from the Committee on Infractions.”).
56. As noted earlier, some infractions cases are resolved through the summary dispo-
sition process, without a hearing, and cases involving only secondary violations
are resolved by the NCAA’s Vice President for Enforcement Services. See supra
notes 26–27.
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and infractions hearings.  Those changes were intended to address
concerns that enforcement and infractions processes did not meet min-
imum standards of fairness.  The changes included incorporation of
most of the recommendations of the Lee Report,57 including the crea-
tion of a summary disposition process and an appeals process overseen
by an Infractions Appeals Committee.  A prime recommendation that
was not adopted was to sunset the Infractions Committee’s role as
fact-finder.58  Instead, NCAA member institutions responded to this
Lee Report recommendation by adding two public members to the
hearing committee and also by creating a process by which an institu-
tion or involved individual could request a hearing before a hearing
officer rather than before the Infractions Committee.  This hearing of-
ficer alternative was in effect for more than ten years but was never
once utilized.  Ultimately, the provision was removed.59
No document exists to explain why member institutions chose to
continue with an Infractions Committee, adjusted to include two pub-
lic members, rather than move to a hearing officer process.  Moreover,
there is no document that explains why in a ten-year period the hear-
ing officer alternative was not used.  One obvious conclusion is that
the NCAA membership was satisfied that the Infractions Committee
model of dispute resolution adequately served the needs and predilec-
tions of the members.  There are many models of dispute resolution,
and the Infractions Committee process falls well within the parame-
ters of these models.
Alternative dispute resolution as a way to handle disputes is
hardly unique to the NCAA.  It is particularly popular where disputes
likely will arise regularly and frequently, and even more so if there is
a large, specific body of rules to be applied for which a close under-
standing of the enterprise and its common practices is useful, if not
critical.  It is employed in university disciplinary proceedings for
faculty, staff, and students; trade associations; housing associations;
and “fraternal” associations, among others.60  It is the dispute resolu-
tion process of choice in labor–management collective bargaining
57. See LEE REPORT, supra note 10.
58. Id.  The membership also rejected a recommendation to make hearings public.
Id.
59. Compare NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Operating Bylaws, in 1994–95
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 19.2 (noting bylaw change adding hearing officer
provision on Jan. 11, 1994), with NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Operating
Bylaws, in 2001–04 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 19.2 (making no reference to
hearing officer).  In this model, the role of the Infractions Committee was to re-
view proposed summary dispositions and dispositions recommended by the hear-
ing officer.
60. See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 28 (2010).
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agreements.61  It also is used to resolve disputes arising out of na-
tional team and Olympics competition and for drug-testing appeals.62
A sine qua non of hearing bodies is that they are neutral.  Yet, neu-
trality means different things in different contexts and does not al-
ways mean that members of a hearing body must be separate from the
members of an association.  In university disciplinary proceedings, for
example, hearing bodies typically are composed of other staff and
faculty at the institution.63  Trade associations are another exam-
ple.64  Often an arbitrator is required to have expertise in the subject
area, both in the formal requirements and in the operation and the
understanding of its members.65  This is particularly so when, as with
the NCAA, controversies involve a large and complex subject matter
that references numerous rules and policies specific to the association.
Formal associations such as the NCAA develop because of pur-
poseful decisions by their members, not happenstance.  The NCAA in-
corporates an interrelated network of mutually assumed obligations.
In a real sense, it is a world unto itself, with arrangements and rules
understandable to those within but perhaps less easily parsed by
those outside.  NCAA bylaws bind institutions formally through their
consent as association members and directly through their participa-
tion in the adoption of bylaws and policies.  Staff members and stu-
dent-athletes are bound formally through their association with
member institutions and directly through their agreement in writing
to be bound.66  They are also educated about NCAA bylaws that affect
61. See Gerald M. Moody Jr., Writing is Reading is Writing: Two Applications of the
Parol Evidence Rule to Collective Bargaining Agreements, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 326, 328 (2009).
62. See General Information, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.
org/history (last visited Dec. 22, 2010).
63. This is the case even though public universities are state actors subject to the
strictures of minimum due process.
64. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creat-
ing Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724
(2001); Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier
Fish Market, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 313 (2006).  In prison disciplinary hearings, the
hearing body may be comprised of prison officials, even wardens.  Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571 (1974).
65. There is even a growing body of commentary questioning whether corporate gov-
ernance is best effected by independent directors. See, e.g., Eric M. Fogel & An-
drew M. Geier, Strangers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Independent Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (2007); Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Share-
holder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
66. All staff members annually affirm in writing their compliance with NCAA by-
laws. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art. 30.3.5 (Report of NCAA Violation Involv-
ing Institution).  An institution’s president or chancellor independently certifies
annually that staff and boosters are rules-compliant and that they are provided
NCAA rules education. Id. arts. 30.3 (Certification of Compliance), 30.3.1 (NCAA
Rules Review), 30.3.3 (Certification of Policies, Procedures and Practices).  Coach
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them.67  Holding those within this world to rules to which they certify
agreement, and about which they receive additional and focused in-
struction, lends itself most appropriately to a dispute resolution body
that itself is fully familiar with the course of dealings of the group.
It is no surprise, then, that NCAA member institutions look to a
dispute resolution process whose decision-makers understand the
world whose disputes they are to resolve.  For the Infractions Commit-
tee, this means a majority of committee members who come from uni-
versities and athletics conferences.  Moving to a model with decision-
makers wholly outside the membership might enhance the perception
of objectivity and fairness.  Perception clearly is important.  If a move
to a new model would enhance perception of the process and retain
the advantages of the present model, it might be worthwhile to make
such a move.  But in a zero-sum world there are always trade-offs.
The loss here would be substantial and would offset any potential
gain, because it would run directly to the breadth of critical expertise
needed for the Infractions Committee to operate effectively.  This im-
pact would affect the scope of infractions hearings and the ability to
ferret out all relevant facts.  Equally serious, it would adversely affect
deliberations, which invariably benefit from the variety of perspec-
tives and first-hand experiences of the current mix of committee
members.
The same can be said for a more modest proposal advanced by a
former member and chair of the committee—to increase from two to
four the public members on the eight-member hearing committee68
who hear and deliberate cases.69  There is no question that public
members of the committee have been extremely valuable to the infrac-
tions process.  Those who have served over the last seventeen years
have brought sharp intellects and incisive questioning to the process,
and both the committee and the process are richer for their presence.
We disagree, however, that changing the mix of public and nonpub-
lic members of the hearing committee would better serve the interests
of the NCAA membership and produce better results.  Our primary
rationale is that the addition of more public members to the commit-
tee would come at the expense of valuable insight and perspective
contracts must contain a statement regarding rules compliance. Id. art. 11.2.1
(Stipulation That NCAA Enforcement Provisions Apply).  Student-athletes annu-
ally sign a statement affirming compliance with NCAA bylaws that affect them.
Id. arts. 3.2.4.6 (Student-Athlete Statement), 14.1.3 (Student-Athlete State-
ment), 30.12 (Student-Athlete Statement).
67. Id. arts. 22.2.1.2(c) (Rules Compliance), 30.3.1 (NCAA Rules Review).  Coaches
who recruit off-campus annually must pass a standardized national test devel-
oped by the NCAA national office covering NCAA recruiting legislation. Id. art.
11.5 (Certification to Recruit Off Campus).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 19–20.
69. Marsh, supra note 5, at 702–10.
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from a strong mix of individuals from NCAA member institutions and
conferences.  For reasons we discussed previously,70 we believe it is
critical that there be substantial athletics experience and a strong
faculty and campus presence on the committee.  To require four hear-
ing committee members to be public members would hamstring the
Infractions Committee in its ability to take advantage of the special
skills and backgrounds of individuals from NCAA member institu-
tions and conferences.71
We also believe that the current public–nonpublic member mix on
the hearing committee better advances the goals of a voluntary associ-
ation that polices itself.72  Considering the heavy workload associated
with service on the Infractions Committee,73 it may be more realistic
to expect the requisite level of commitment from committee members
whose service generally is seen as a valuable, if not expected, compo-
nent of their job responsibilities.  University faculty members, for ex-
ample, typically have a significant service component within their job
descriptions.  Pro bono service, of course, also is valued within the le-
gal profession, but public members of the Infractions Committee un-
doubtedly face pressures from their employers that are different in
kind from those faced by employees of NCAA member institutions and
conferences.74
We do not deny that the positions institutional members hold
within their universities and conferences, at least those with positions
within athletics, may lead to perceptions that these Infractions Com-
mittee members are not as independent as they might otherwise be.
We note, however, that not all institutional members serve in athlet-
ics positions at their universities—the more removed from positions
within athletics departments, the less active the perception of non-
independence.  Perceptions aside, it is also true there is a natural
alignment of some nonpublic members of the Infractions Committee
70. See supra text accompanying notes 33–37.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 32–34.  In the early years of the Infractions
Committee, nearly every member was a faculty member, and when the authors
joined the committee in 1999 and 2000, only four members of the hearing com-
mittee were faculty members.  At present the hearing committee includes two
conference commissioners and two current or former athletics administrators
(one former athletics director, who is also a faculty member, and one senior dep-
uty athletics director).
72. See Marsh & Robbins, supra note 5, at 679 (“[T]his enforcement process was cre-
ated by member institutions, for representatives of the membership to sit in judg-
ment of each other.”).
73. See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
74. “Premature” departures from the Infractions Committee (resignations occurring
prior to the completion of a full nine-year period of service)—again, generally
because of an inability to devote the necessary time and attention to committee
work—come from both public and nonpublic members, but within the last two
years, two public members have stepped down before the end of their terms.
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with the NCAA.  Yet, “aligned with” means neither “part of” nor “co-
opted.”  FARs, for example, are charged with the oversight of NCAA
rules compliance on their campus.  It would be passing strange to con-
sider their “alignment” with the NCAA problematic at the infractions
hearing level but not on their campuses.75  Although we agree that
public members on the Infractions Committee “bring a sense of sea-
soned objectivity and skepticism to the process,”76 we disagree that
there is a significant, qualitative difference between public and non-
public members in how much they speak during hearings and deliber-
ations, in how often they question the fairness of bylaws or
investigative practices, or in how direct their questioning may be.77
We also suspect that public members, by virtue of continued service,
also begin to “align with” the NCAA and certainly are so perceived.
Moreover, and fundamentally, such alignment is an inevitable by-
product of the requisite experience needed for committee service and
is entirely appropriate in the infractions environment of a voluntary,
self-policing association.78
In any event, alignment with the NCAA is not the issue—for exam-
ple, if the NCAA membership as a whole believes Infractions Commit-
tee penalties are too light or too harsh, the committee must pay heed
and comply with the goals and objectives of the association within
which it operates.  The real issue is the independence of the Infrac-
tions Committee from the NCAA enforcement staff.  Here the Infrac-
75. University counsel are also “aligned with” their respective institutions.
76. Marsh, supra note 5, at 705.  Although we agree with Professor Marsh that there
have been occasions when issues raised by public members have “changed the
direction of a hearing and even the outcome in the case” and have “helped [the
committee] to get to more just results,” id. at 707–08, we believe that the same
can be said for the nonpublic members.
Another point perhaps deserves mention as well.  Professor Marsh bases some
of his rationale on the judicial experience of public members: “Public members
who are former judges tend to surface issues concerning the fairness of the sys-
tem and investigation with more regularity than other members.” Id. at 707.  At
the time Professor Marsh wrote, all of the current and former public members of
the committee had been judges.  That is no longer the case—the three current
public members of the Infractions Committee, including the two that serve on the
hearing committee, are not former judges.
77. See id. at 707–08.
78. See id. at 705–06.  Professor Marsh states:
A Faculty Athletic Representative, athletic director, or conference com-
missioner has a direct tie to the NCAA and professional, regular deal-
ings with the NCAA.  He or she will likely serve on NCAA committees,
attend NCAA conventions and regional compliance meetings, and from
time to time have dealings with the NCAA enforcement staff and other
NCAA staff members on matters relating to their own student-athletes
and institutions.  They are naturally aligned with the NCAA, either ex-
pressly or by drift or gravity.  They certainly are aligned in appearance.
For all the right reasons, they feel like they are a part of the NCAA be-
cause they are the NCAA.
Id.
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tions Committee, by its words and actions, must be continually
vigilant—not only to ensure that its work is separate and independent
from that of the enforcement staff, but also to educate observers of the
infractions process about those separate roles.  In that regard, we note
that the Infractions Committee has reduced major allegations to sec-
ondary violations,79 failed to find violations that were alleged,80 found
violations not alleged,81 stated it would have found violations had
they been alleged,82 and also included in reports discussion and disap-
proval of investigative processes.83
We recognize the difficult balance that must be struck between
athletics experience, which generally comes from university or confer-
ence members of the Infractions Committee, and distance from the
athletics enterprise, which carries with it at least a perception of ad-
ded independence.  Ultimately, however, we believe the balance must
tip in favor of relevant experience.84
For us, the decision comes down to two important factors: (1) the
benefits accrued from adding more public members would come at the
cost of losing considerable on-the-ground experience in intercollegiate
athletics that institutional or conference members bring to the com-
mittee; and (2) the infractions process is a member-driven process that
is designed to have member institutions—via their employees—police
each other.  We believe the NCAA membership has struck the appro-
priate balance—in 1993 when it added public members to the commit-
tee rather than adopt the Lee Report recommendation to employ
hearing officers who were wholly independent from the NCAA mem-
bership, and again in 2002 when it increased the size of the Infrac-
tions Committee to accommodate a second coordinator of appeals and
decided that “no more than three” public members should serve on the
committee (including one who could serve as a coordinator of appeals).
Finally, we believe that current NCAA bylaws and committee cus-
tom adequately address concerns about Infractions Committee neu-
79. E.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 171 (2000)
(Murray State University).  Public Infractions Committee reports are available
on the NCAA website at https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/homepage (follow “Search”
link; then follow “Major Infractions” link).
80. E.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 248 (2006)
(Florida A&M University).
81. E.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 287 (2008)
(Indiana University).
82. E.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 193 (2002)
(University of Alabama).
83. E.g., NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INFRACTIONS REPORT NO. 265 (2007)
(West Virginia University).
84. This is particularly true in light of bylaw restrictions that public members “shall
not be associated with a . . . professional or similar sports organization, or re-
present coaches or athletes in any capacity.” NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art.
19.1.1 (Composition of Committee).
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trality toward participants in the infractions process.  It is inevitable
that on occasion nonpublic members will know or have worked with
representatives of an institution or a coach involved in an infractions
case.  In this respect, it is no different from any other alternative dis-
pute resolution process or, for that matter, client representation and
court appearance in areas that are not large population centers.
When relationships are close enough to raise the appearance of bias or
animus, Infractions Committee members recuse themselves.85  In
cases where there was no such close relationship, in our years on the
Infractions Committee, we neither detected even a hint that acquain-
tance affected decision-making, nor are we aware of any case in which
there was even a thread of evidence of bias or animus.  In addition,
with an eight-member hearing committee, any such potential for an
individual member’s bias to have an impact on a decision is extraordi-
narily unlikely.  In any event, such a bias could impact decision-mak-
ing only if embodied in a cogent argument independent of bias and
independently persuasive.
III. INFRACTIONS COMMITTEE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The fundamental role of the Infractions Committee is to listen to
and evaluate evidence presented at an infractions hearing, to deter-
mine whether the evidence presented is sufficient to conclude that
NCAA violations occurred, and to impose appropriate penalties if find-
ings of violations are found.  The committee does not investigate alle-
gations of major violations, conduct prehearing witness interviews, or
participate in prehearing conferences.  These functions are left exclu-
sively to the NCAA enforcement staff, which then bears the burden of
“making its case” at the infractions hearing that violations occurred.
If the enforcement staff presents sufficient evidence to make its case,
the Infractions Committee will make findings of violations; if the en-
forcement staff fails to meet its burden, the committee will find that
the alleged violations were not proved.
Typically the Infractions Committee will hear two cases during a
hearing weekend, with one hearing on Friday and a second hearing on
Saturday.  The committee then will deliberate on both cases on Sun-
day.86  During those deliberations, the committee will discuss each al-
85. See supra note 41.  Recusals have occurred when a member attended or was pre-
viously employed at the university appearing before the Infractions Committee,
even when the member had no interaction with that university’s athletics depart-
ment.  Recusals also have occurred when an Infractions Committee member
knew a coach at a rival school because of athletics conference governance.
86. Occasionally hearings will be concluded within a few hours and the Infractions
Committee will deliberate the same day.  Typically, however, hearings last for
several hours, and sometimes well into the evening, so Sunday is the only time
available for deliberations.  In rare circumstances, a case may be so involved that
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leged violation and the evidence in the record that tends either to
support or to disprove the allegation.  The record includes both testi-
mony at the hearing and written materials submitted by the enforce-
ment staff, institution, and, if involved, coaches or other staff
members alleged to have committed major violations.87  During its de-
liberations, the committee will make preliminary decisions regarding
findings of violations and, if violations are found, penalties to be im-
posed.  Each case is assigned to a committee member who works with
an Infractions Committee staff director to draft a preliminary infrac-
tions report.88  Once the preliminary report has been completed
(sometimes after several drafts), the full committee will reconvene on
a telephone conference call to review and finalize the report.89
Infractions Committee deliberations are governed by NCAA legis-
lation, which states that after the infractions hearing has been com-
pleted, the committee “shall excuse all others from the hearing” and
“make its determinations of fact and violation in private.”90  In other
words, Infractions Committee deliberations and case-relevant discus-
sions are confidential within the committee.  The committee is to base
its findings “on information presented to it that it determines to be
credible, persuasive and of a kind on which reasonably prudent per-
sons rely in the conduct of serious affairs.”91  The finding of a violation
or the imposition of a penalty must be “by majority vote of the mem-
bers . . . present and voting.”92  If the full hearing committee of eight
only one hearing will be scheduled, with the hearing lasting two or even three
days.
87. The written materials include the enforcement staff’s “notice of allegations,”
which “shall list the NCAA legislation alleged to have been violated, as well as
the details of each allegation,” NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art. 32.6.1.2 (Con-
tents of Notice of Allegations); any responses to the notice of allegations that have
been submitted by the institution and involved individuals; and an enforcement
staff “case summary,” which “indicates the status of each allegation and identi-
fies the individuals on whom and the information on which the staff will rely in
presenting the case,” id. art. 32.6.7 (NCAA Enforcement Staff Case Summary).
Typically the case summary goes well beyond outlining the enforcement staff’s
case and also includes a summary of the other parties’ evidence, including evi-
dence tending to refute the staff’s allegations.
Any written materials that are not formally made part of the record will not
be seen or reviewed by the Infractions Committee.  That includes correspondence
between the enforcement staff and institutions or other involved parties, tran-
scripts of interviews, and any other information surfaced by the parties.
88. The two NCAA staff directors (and their staff support personnel) work exclu-
sively with the Committees on Infractions for Divisions I, II, and III.  They are
not members of the enforcement staff.
89. See supra note 25.
90. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 2, art. 32.8.8 (Posthearing Committee Deliberations).
91. Id. art. 32.8.8.2 (Basis of Findings).
92. Id. art. 32.8.8.4 (Voting Requirements).
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members is not present, “a favorable vote of at least four members” is
required for committee action.93
The bylaws do not address one aspect of the Infractions Commit-
tee’s decision-making process—whether its decisions are to be “con-
sensus” decisions or whether members will write concurring or
dissenting opinions.  The committee always has operated by consen-
sus and reports its decisions “per curiam”—meaning that infractions
reports have the names of all committee members present and voting,
even in the exceptional case in which a member may have been on the
short end of a particular vote.  The Infractions Appeals Committee
also operates by consensus, and we suspect that neither committee
seriously has considered departing from the practice, perhaps in part
because the issue never has been fully discussed.
Another recent recommendation brings squarely to the fore the
question whether there should be a change in the Infractions Commit-
tee’s consensus decision-making process and the introduction of con-
curring and dissenting opinions.94  Three principal arguments are
advanced in support of what might be called “fractured” opinions: dis-
senting opinions would (1) produce better majority opinions; (2) pro-
vide more information and generate discussion among the NCAA
membership, which could enhance the legislative process; and (3) in-
still more public confidence in the infractions process.95
Our first objection to a system of concurring and dissenting opin-
ions is grounded in our concern that the added time and effort to pre-
pare, circulate, and examine such opinions would be detrimental to
the process in other ways.  First, it would add an extra burden to the
workloads of all committee members, and, in light of the burdens that
already exist,96 we wonder what impact such added workload would
have on the willingness to serve, and more importantly, what impact
there would be on the quality of and attention to other aspects of the
job.  Second, the preparation and circulation of dissenting opinions in-
evitably would slow down the report-drafting process considerably,
which would be a substantial detriment to institutions and involved
individuals seeking to know their futures following an infractions
case.  Indeed, a major and recurring criticism of the current system is
that the Infractions Committee processes cases too slowly, with con-
93. Id.  This provision can come into play when the hearing committee is short-
handed due to recusals or schedule conflicts of committee members.  The commit-
tee can conduct its business with a quorum of “[f]our members present and vot-
ing . . . it being understood that the chair shall make a special effort to have full
committee attendance when major infractions cases involving violations are to be
considered.” Id. art. 19.1.1.1 (Quorum).
94. Marsh, supra note 5, at 710–17.  Professor Marsh focuses specifically on dissent-
ing opinions, but his arguments may be applicable to concurring opinions as well.
95. Id.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 24–29.
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tinued detrimental impact not only on those against whom findings of
violations may be made but also on student-athletes and staff not in-
volved in the violations and often not even at the school when viola-
tions were committed.
A much more significant objection to fractured decisions is the det-
rimental impact such a process would have on committee decision-
making.  We do not disagree that majority opinions can be strength-
ened by the preparation and circulation of thoughtful, well-written
dissenting opinions, as they can cause members in the majority to re-
consider and refine their position.  We believe, however, that by its
nature consensus decision-making already forces such discussion, re-
thinking, and reconsideration, and at the same time also provides
other important positives.  Under the current system, committee
members take time to consider and discuss opposing points of view,
sometimes again and again.  Information in the record is examined
closely to review the different views of committee members.  The pro-
cess forces members to consider the grounds for their opinions and to
weigh carefully opposing views—a process similar and, we believe, su-
perior to that engendered by the circulation of dissenting opinions.
One major advantage of consensus decision-making is that it results
from in-person discussion and resolution.  In fractured opinion-mak-
ing, by contrast, a dissenting opinion will be circulated to each com-
mittee member for review; any full committee review likely will occur
by email exchange or at best by phone.
Consensus in Infractions Committee decisions offers the theoreti-
cal possibility of a member “giving in,” but it has the real and concrete
virtue of pushing careful, considered debate.  Concurring or dissenting
opinions might affect the process by leading too easily to a failure of
full deliberation.  This would be a significant loss to the process, par-
ticularly because the different experiences, backgrounds, and perspec-
tives of committee members are critical to a full understanding of a
case and its ramifications.  Consensus decision-making can help to en-
sure that attention to viewpoint breadth on the front end—through
appointment of a committee with a diverse array of experiences and
characteristics—is carried through on the back end, at the time of
decision.
Like a jury, the Infractions Committee is a finder of fact.  A com-
mon requirement of juries in civil and particularly in criminal cases is
that their decisions be unanimous.  Among the reasons offered for jury
unanimity are that it enhances the accuracy of decisions, is a compo-
nent of assuring a fair trial,97 provides that the different views and
97. See generally LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL
347–51 (1947); William Haralson, Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases,
21 MISS. L.J. 185, 191 (1950); James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5
HARV. L. REV. 249, 295–96 (1892).
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experiences of jury members who represent a “cross section” of the
public will be heard, and assures that minority viewpoints will not be
given short shrift.98  These same goals are furthered by consensus In-
fractions Committee decisions.
One change that likely would ensue were there to be concurrences,
dissents, or both, is that the opinions and conclusions of individual
hearing committee members would be disclosed.  This would be a ma-
jor departure from current practice.  A positive outcome would be
more accountability for decisions, but it would be accountability fo-
cused on particular members and not the committee as a whole.  This
may lead to other consequences more difficult to predict and far less
salutary to the process.  Concurrences and dissents not only identify
the particular members writing them, but they also more clearly iden-
tify those in the majority as responsible for the positions stated
therein.  There is a theoretical possibility that nonpublic committee
members in the majority might be less willing to join in majority opin-
ions that take positions contrary to what their institutions or confer-
ences might prefer.
We do agree that there might be one practical, and important, ad-
vantage to concurring and dissenting opinions—they are more likely
than consensus opinions to highlight clearly when there are legitimate
differences of viewpoint among committee members on what consti-
tutes the commission of a violation, the extent to which evidence sup-
ports a finding and why, the gravity of a violation as committed, and
the appropriateness of penalties imposed by the committee.  While in-
fractions reports typically discuss areas in which there may be reason-
able differences of opinion regarding the requirements of NCAA
legislation (and sometimes indicate if a committee decision was a
“close call”), they do not explicitly expose disagreement among com-
mittee members.  Concurring and dissenting opinions would do that,
and the result might be a greater likelihood of membership discussion
about NCAA policy choices and the possibility that a bylaw change
should be considered.99
It is much less clear that dissenting opinions would strengthen
public confidence in the infractions process.  To the extent that there
is a perception that the committee acts perfunctorily in deciding cases
98. See William v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99–100 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 156 (1968).  The United States Supreme Court has concluded that there is
little difference between decisions made by juries required to act unanimously
and those permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 11–1 or 10–2.  Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).  The Court, however, reached this conclusion in the
context of a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof standard and the specter
of hung juries and retrials, neither of which is applicable to Infractions Commit-
tee proceedings.
99. See Marsh, supra note 5, at 716 (stating that publication of dissenting opinions
would “further the legislative process”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-3DR\NEB301.txt unknown Seq: 30 23-MAR-11 12:19
466 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:437
or acts in lock-step with the position of the NCAA enforcement staff,
concurrences and dissents certainly would underscore that this is not
the case.  However, any perception that the committee does not work
hard cannot, we think, be well informed or widely shared—not when
committee decisions are lengthy and rationale is developed at length.
All one has to do is to read infractions reports to realize that they are
far from perfunctory.  Some go on for dozens of pages, and all detail
thoroughly the rationale underlying the committee’s findings and pen-
alties.  If the concern is a perception that the Infractions Committee
“rubber stamps” the position of the NCAA enforcement staff,100 that
perception may be addressed in other ways—by regularly reminding
observers of the separate and distinct roles performed by the commit-
tee and the enforcement staff and by writing infractions reports that
clearly distinguish between committee positions and enforcement staff
positions.  In this light, we note that it is not uncommon for the Infrac-
tions Committee to reject the position of the enforcement staff.101
One other point deserves mention—the NCAA enforcement staff is
comprised of dedicated, responsible, and hardworking professionals
who are committed to conducting thorough and fair investigations and
presenting strong cases.  If they are doing their jobs well, which is
typically the case, it should come as no surprise that Infractions Com-
mittee decisions often track the “position” of the enforcement staff.
We also disagree with the notion that there is something “dishon-
est” about consensus opinions.102  To those who make an effort to un-
derstand the process, a decision joined by all members of a
deliberative body does not signal that the members value collegiality
over the reasoned judgment demanded by their role.  To the contrary,
a consensus decision typically means that members ultimately
100. Id. at 715.
101. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text; see also Marsh, supra note 5, at
712–13 (“[D]isagreements do occur, both at hearings and in Committee delibera-
tions.  Sometimes, the focus of the disagreement is between the Committee and
the enforcement staff because allegations are being presented at the hearing.
Committee members who are skeptical of whether the evidence supports a find-
ing of an allegation made by the enforcement staff are not timid in saying so
immediately upon learning of such evidence, rather than waiting to make the
point in deliberations.  Committee members will also press the staff on why a
particular allegation is being made in the case being heard, but not in prior cases
where the violations appeared to be more systematic and egregious.  Occasion-
ally, when the enforcement staff is facing brisk questioning from the Committee
and can see the handwriting on the wall regarding whether the violation will be
found, the staff will withdraw the allegation right on the spot, to the great relief
of the institution or involved coach.  In a few rare cases, the Committee has found
all violations in a case to be only secondary, where the staff presented the case as
major.  This further underscores the point that the hearings actually do matter
and the Committee does not rubber-stamp allegations brought by the staff.”)
(footnotes omitted).
102. See Marsh, supra note 5, at 715.
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reached agreement.  Again, juries provide a good example—just be-
cause a jury returns a unanimous verdict does not indicate to anyone
with an understanding of how juries work that the members of the
jury were docile, timid, or averse to meaningful, perhaps contentious,
discussion of opposing viewpoints.  Moreover, the committee in con-
sensus reports nonetheless may signal areas of concern even if there is
a consensus decision.  Further, “strong differences of opinion in [in-
fractions] cases are remarkably uncommon. . . .  Many of the violations
are self-reported by the schools, and in most cases the institutions and
involved individuals agree that the violations occurred.”103  Because
committee deliberation almost always leads, ultimately, to agreement
by all members, it is true that even if concurring and dissenting opin-
ions became a part of the Infractions Committee’s decision-making
process, they would be relatively rare.  However, that fact cuts both
ways.  There is no need to get worked up about either the existence or
nonexistence of such opinions.  Nonetheless, on balance we believe the
disadvantages of concurring and dissenting opinions so far outweigh
the advantages that a change is unwarranted.
Clearly one can marshal an impressive body of literature, includ-
ing the perspectives of former United States Supreme Court Justices,
extolling the virtues of dissenting opinions.104  We note again, how-
ever, that the Infractions Committee is a fact-finder, not an appellate
body, and these decisions may be seen as inapposite.  Ultimately, how-
ever, we believe that in the NCAA infractions world, there are good
reasons for the Infractions Committee to speak with one voice in mak-
ing findings and imposing penalties.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
has remarked that “concern for the well-being of the court on which
one serves, for the authority and respect its pronouncements com-
mand, may be the most powerful deterrent to writing separately.”105
We believe that the authority and respect that Infractions Committee
decisions should command are enhanced by consensus decisions and
that fragmented opinions would undermine the strength and legiti-
macy of the infractions process.  The Infractions Committee and the
process within which it works already are easy targets both for insti-
tutions and coaches unhappy with findings and penalties against
them and also for the public and other institutions believing penalties
were too light.  Dissenting opinions that signal a divided committee
easily could provide even more fodder to critics of the system.
In that respect, we find it doubtful that the often fragmented opin-
ions of a divided United States Supreme Court, regularly including
multiple concurring and dissenting opinions of individual Justices,
103. Id. at 711.
104. See id. at 713–16.
105. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 142
(1990).
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have enhanced public confidence in, or respect for, the Court.  Fur-
ther, we do not believe they have led to clarity of principle permitting
ease of understanding and a clear roadmap for future conduct106—
elements that are particularly critical in the NCAA world where rules
compliance depends on voluntary cooperation.  There are times, more-
over, when a consensus decision signals that a body felt it important
to speak with one voice, even if there was disagreement and even
when there were remaining differences among members.  We point to
the case of Brown v. Board of Education,107 which involved remarka-
ble behind-the-scenes efforts by Chief Justice Earl Warren to ensure a
unanimous decision of the Court.108  As a recent biographer put it,
Chief Justice Warren believed strongly that public confidence in, and
acceptance of, the ultimate decision would come about only if the
Court spoke with “a single, clear voice on a matter of moral ur-
gency.”109  While we do not begin to compare NCAA infractions cases
to Brown in terms of “moral urgency,” major infractions cases none-
theless can have very serious implications for institutions and in-
volved individuals, and a strong, cohesive message from the
Infractions Committee can help to strengthen public confidence in the
process.
As to the suggestion that a “fear of litigation” may be reason for the
Infractions Committee’s use of consensus opinions,110 we can state
emphatically that, in our years on the committee, not once did a threat
of potential litigation influence the committee’s decision-making pro-
cess.  The same can be said for the possibility of appeal to the Infrac-
tions Appeals Committee.  While the Infractions Committee certainly
was cognizant of the prospects of an appeal in any particular case, the
consistent message within the committee was that it simply needed to
do what it believed was right, regardless of the potential for appeal or
litigation.
With that said, however, we do believe that one potential disadvan-
tage of dissenting opinions is that there might be an increase in the
number of cases appealed to the Infractions Appeals Committee and
perhaps even increased litigation.  From the standpoint of member in-
stitutions before the Infractions Committee, this would mean less effi-
ciency to the process and increased costs, particularly in cases
involving findings of violations against coaches and other staff mem-
bers.  Most of the “action” on appeal relates to penalties, not findings
of violations.  Based on our experience with the appeals process, we
106. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
107. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
108. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 682–99 (1975); JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE
FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 309–25 (2006).
109. NEWTON, supra note 108, at 313.
110. See Marsh, supra note 5, at 711.
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have little doubt that appellants would seize upon dissenting opinions,
particularly dissents as to penalties, both as a reason to appeal and as
an arguing point on appeal.111
IV. CONCLUSION
The work of the Infractions Committee is high-profile and often
subject to close scrutiny by NCAA member institutions; coaches, staff
members, and student-athletes of those institutions; the media; and
intercollegiate sports fans in general.  The result is a stream of recom-
mendations for change.  In this Article we examined proposals specifi-
cally focused on changes to the composition of the Infractions
Committee and the committee’s decision-making process.  That exami-
nation offered an opportunity to articulate clearly the reasons sup-
porting what currently is done.  In turn, that articulation prompted
our conclusion that the current committee structure and processes
work quite well, thank you, and should be retained.  We hope that we
do not sound like a modern version of the tutor Pangloss, who shouts
with blind optimism and more than a little thick-headedness that “all
is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.”112  We certainly do
not contend that the current configuration of the Infractions Commit-
tee and its current decision-making process represent the best possi-
ble resolution in the best of all possible worlds.  We do know, however,
that the Infractions Committee and the infractions and enforcement
processes operate in a world bounded by finites, and in that world
there can be no perfect resolution.  We conclude that the current com-
position and decision-making process of the Infractions Committee
carry the least negative consequences to the purposes and interests of
NCAA member institutions and are better suited to meet all of the
roles and responsibilities of the Infractions Committee than any other
proposed model we have seen.  Not perfect, then, but optimum.
111. On the other hand, it is possible that the Infractions Appeals Committee,
whether by design or not, might consider cases involving no dissents to be those
that could be dealt with on an expedited basis, with the end result being fewer
reversals.  Another possibility might be a bylaw change to restrict appeals to
those cases in which there is a disagreement among committee members, or, al-
ternatively, to permit in-person appearances and arguments only in cases in
which there is a dissent, an approach employed by some intermediate appellate
courts.
112. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE, OR OPTIMISM (Henry Morley trans., Barnes & Noble Books
2003) (1759).
